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Defending the Delusional, the Irrational, and the 
Dangerous 
 
J.J. Child; H.S. Crombag; G.R. Sullivan 
 
At roughly 2 pm on Sunday 31st January 2016, Simon Taj came across the broken-
down vehicle of Mohammed Awain and stopped to offer assistance.1 Smoke was 
coming from the vehicle, and the doors were open; Awain is an electrician, and wires 
and equipment were visible in the open boot. Unfortunately, Taj mistook this 
equipment for components of a terrorist bomb that Awain was on the point of 
assembling to explode. Taj called the police, who attended the scene. Following police 
assurances as to Awain’s innocence, Taj initially drove away, but soon returned still 
convinced that Awain was a terrorist, and that he must do something to stop him. At 
2.46 pm, Taj launched a ferocious attack on Awain with a metal tyre lever, almost 
killing him. When police arrived and restrained Taj, he expressed surprise – ‘why are 
you arresting me he's the terrorist’.2 It was later discovered that Taj had been drinking 
heavily on Friday 29th January into the early hours of Saturday; but as Taj was so calm 
and lucid at interview, held immediately after the attack, the police officers present did 
not arrange for blood samples to be taken. Taj was charged with attempted murder, 
but claimed to have acted in self-defence on the basis of his mistaken belief.  
Mistaken delusional beliefs of this kind, completely unfounded on ‘any objective 
consideration of the facts’,3 present fundamental challenges to the legal system. 
Where mistaken beliefs are not rooted in observable reality, courts (and juries) cannot 
engage empathetically – these are not relatable mistakes, but the products of 
abnormality.4 And yet beliefs, whether mistaken or not, are central to our moral and 
legal conceptions of culpability, and so it is vital that they are understood. It may be, 
for example, that D’s delusional belief demonstrates a lack of criminal culpability (ie, it 
reveals a lack of mens rea, or provides the basis for a defence); or more 
fundamentally, D’s delusion may reveal him as a non-rational agent whose conduct 
should not expose him to criminal conviction.5 Of course, the mere fact of a delusion 
                                                          
 J.J. Child, Senior Lecturer in Criminal Law, University of Birmingham (J.J.Child@Bham.ac.uk); H.S. 
Crombag, Senior Lecturer in Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Sussex; G.R. Sullivan, 
Emeritus Professor of Law, UCL. We thank participants from the Criminal Law Conversations 
Conference (KCL) for comments on an earlier version of this article, as well as Dr Ailbhe O’Loughlin. 
Our research was assisted by access to the Expert Reports used in Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, 
gained with the permission of Mr Taj (19th February 2019). 
1 Facts from Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743. 
2 Ibid [9]. 
3 Ibid [64].   
4 Usefully discussed in Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (1970) Ch 11.   
5 The insanity rules are sometimes presented in these terms. D’s lack of rationality can be analysed 
categorically, or (more plausibly) in relation to a time and fact specific event. See, Law Commission, 
Insanity and Automatism (Discussion Paper, 2013) Appendix A.     
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will not always undermine culpability. For example, D may be culpably responsible for 
causing harms despite his delusion, if that delusion is trivial or unrelated to his criminal 
conduct; or, alternatively, D may be culpably responsible for his delusion, where that 
delusion is caused by D’s voluntary conduct and would or should have been 
foreseeable to him (ie, circumstances of ‘prior fault’). Psychiatric experts and clinical 
psychologists can assist courts in identifying conditions and events that typically result 
in delusions, thereby reducing the risks of fabrication and malingering. It is for the law, 
however, to determine the implications of D’s delusional and irrational beliefs for the 
purposes of liability.   
The law must provide a clear and fair way forward. We can acknowledge the 
challenges posed by delusional and irrational beliefs, but still insist on rules that 
identify and track reliable markers of culpability, and which protect the public from 
potential future harms. Unfortunately, although these aims are acknowledged, the 
common law has developed a series of complex and convoluted rules that have 
struggled to give them coherent expression. Central here are the rules relating to non-
insane automatism,6 intoxication, and insanity. Aptly described as a ‘quagmire’7 of 
legal reasoning, clear (though admittedly difficult) questions of deluded culpability 
have become distorted and lost within complex and often intractable debates: 
distinguishing between basic and specific intent offences;8 between internal and 
external causes;9 between irrational/uncontrolled and involuntary conduct;10 and so 
on.11 Complex debates of this kind could be tolerated if they succeeded in marking 
genuine distinctions in moral culpability, but as we will discuss, this is typically not the 
case.      
Our aim in this article is to expose the most fundamental problems with the 
current law as it applies to delusional and/or irrational beliefs, and to offer some 
suggestions for clarification and reform. The recent Court of Appeal decision in Taj, 
introduced above, will be used to exemplify many of these problems. Part 1 sets out 
and critiques the structure of the current law. In particular, we highlight the legal 
importance of identifying a single dominant cause for cases involving delusions or 
other irrational beliefs, and the problem this creates in cases of co-morbidity and/or 
causal uncertainty. Following this, we drill down to analyse each potentially applicable 
set of rules individually: intoxication in Part 2, insanity in Part 3, and delusions that fall 
outside both categories in Part 4. Our recommendations across each part of this article 
are directed to the courts, and have been consciously crafted to remain within the 
                                                          
6 Hereafter ‘automatism’. 
7 Quick [1973] QB 910, 922. 
8 Essential for the intoxication rules (Majewski [1977] AC 443), and probably for prior fault automatism 
(Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760).   
9 Essential to distinguish insanity from non-insane automatism and intoxication (Sullivan [1984] AC 
156). 
10 Essential to identify automatism (Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223).  
11 Several others could be mentioned here. See Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law (7th Ed, 2019) 
Ch 18-19; Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (15th Ed, 2018) Ch 9.  
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legitimate scope of common law clarification. In doing so, we acknowledge (though 
certainly regret) that legislative reform remains unlikely.12   
 
1. Structural Focus on Cause  
In order to assess the relevance of a delusional and/or irrational belief within the 
current law, emphasis is first placed on identifying its cause. It is clear that insanity 
rules can only apply where delusions are internally caused, by contrast to cases of 
automatism or radical confusion caused by external physical impacts, alcohol, non-
medicinal or medicinal drugs. Special intoxication rules relating to responsibility and 
culpability may apply if the externally induced state of automatism/confusion is caused 
by the voluntary consumption of a ‘dangerous drug’.13 These distinctions are not 
arbitrary, but have grown from (mostly outdated) psychological understandings that 
focus too narrowly on root causes. As per Devlin J (as he was then) in Hill v Baxter:  
If disease is not the cause, if there is some temporary loss of consciousness 
arising accidentally, it is reasonable to hope that it will not be repeated and 
that it is safe to let an acquitted man go entirely free. But if disease is 
present, the same thing may happen again...14 
As proxies for tests of future dangerousness (insanity) and prior-fault (intoxication), 
the blunt causal distinctions within the current law have been the subject of cogent 
criticism.15 For insanity, the core assumption is that internally caused incapacity is 
blameless but presents a continuing danger, requiring treatment and/or constraint. 
However, just as we know internal causes may be temporary and/or non-dangerous16 
(and otherwise resistant to the insanity label17), so external causes may be long-lasting 
and give rise to substantial risks of reoccurrence;18 and in the notable case of diabetic 
shock or coma, which can arise from either internal or external causes, the conditions 
and associated risks may be identical.19 For intoxication and prior-fault, similar 
problems arise. The core assumption here is that intoxicated mistakes are 
blameworthy, requiring a special route to liability. However, again, this should be 
questioned; both as to the intrinsic blameworthiness of intoxication (discussed in Part 
2), as well as the focus on intoxication over other blameworthy causes. For example, 
                                                          
12 The most likely route to legislative reform is through the Law Commission. The Commission paused 
their project on insanity and automatism in 2013 (n5), prioritising related work on unfitness to plead. 
Following completion of the latter project, it is contended that the time is now right to reengage with 
the former.   
13 Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152. 
14 [1958] 1 QB 277, 285.  
15 Usefully summarised in Law Commission, (n5) Paras 1.37-1.47.  
16 E.g., an operable congestion of blood on the brain. See Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399.   
17 For example, sleep-walking and epilepsy. See, Mackay and Mitchell, ‘Sleepwalking, Automatism 
and Insanity’ [2006] CrimLR 901.  
18 E.g., external events leading to post-traumatic stress disorder. See Kormos, ‘The Post Traumatic 
Stress Defence in Canada: Reconnoitring the “Old Lie”’ (2008) 54 CrimLQ 189. 




non-intoxicated prior fault can lead to serious harms as well (eg, where D fails to 
manage blood sugar levels after injecting insulin), and yet prior fault of this kind is 
limited to the automatism rules; such rules (unlike intoxication) will not engage D who 
is caused to lack mens rea but is otherwise voluntary in their actions.20 Similarly, where 
D’s prior fault results in an internally caused incapacity that leads to harms (eg, where 
D fails to take anti-psychotic medication and uncontrollably attacks V), the common 
law does not recognise at all the operation of prior fault rules. In each case, the causal 
assumptions about dangerousness and blame that underpin the current law appear 
problematic.21      
 Unfortunately, although courts regularly acknowledge the uncertain tracing 
between these underlying policies and their doctrinal expression in the common law,22 
little has been done to address it. Rather, notable appeals on automatism, intoxication 
and insanity have been more likely to entrench and complicate existing doctrinal 
causal distinctions than to re-assess them in light of new understanding – deferring 
critical engagement to a legislative process that shows little sign of life.23 The problem 
is made worse by the polarising legal outcomes that result from doctrinal capture within 
a certain set of rules. Where D’s conduct is found to have been involuntary because 
of a blameless state of automatism, he will be given an unqualified acquittal; where D 
is found insane, he will be subject to the special verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity (with the potential for compulsory treatment and supervision24); and where D 
is found to have been voluntarily intoxicated, he will usually be convicted for at least a 
basic intent offence.25 These differences are further marked by the reversed burden 
of proof applicable to insanity cases.26 In this manner, not only do the doctrinal rules 
fail to track their underlying policy aims, but their strict application means that such 
failure will always have material effects on a defendant’s legal position. Equally, the 
sharp causal distinctions required by the law are ill-equipped to deal with (far from 
uncommon) cases where cause is uncertain; where symptoms are non-specific, 
                                                          
20 I.e. Lack of voluntary action is pre-requisite for automatism, and so it is also a pre-requisite for prior 
fault automatism. This makes prior fault automatism considerably narrower in application than 
intoxication. See Child and Reed, ‘Automatism is Never a Defence’ (2014) NILQ 167.  
21 See Child and Sullivan, ‘When does the insanity defence apply? Some recent cases’ (2014) 
CrimLR 788; Law Commission, (n5) Ch 6, proposing that prior fault rules should apply to any new 
defence of ‘not criminally responsible by reason of recognised medical condition.’ 
22 Even within the leading cases of Sullivan [1984] AC 156 (insanity) and Majewski [1977] AC 443 
(intoxication) there are several references to the rules as not strictly logical or principled.   
23 See, for example, Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223 on automatism, distinguishing ‘irrational’ from 
‘involuntary’; Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125 on intoxication, distinguishing basic and specific intent; 
and Johnson [2007] EWCA Crim 1978 on insanity, distinguishing knowledge of legal and moral 
wrongdoing.   
24 Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, s5. 
25 D’s voluntary intoxication will effectively substitute for any missing mens rea and lack of 
voluntariness for basic intent offences, and in the context of defences, will prevent D relying on 
unreasonable intoxicated beliefs. If D’s intoxication did not prevent him from forming an intent 
required to prove the crime charged, D will be found guilty under the normal rules of liability.  
26 Usefully discussed in Jones, ‘Insanity, Automatism, and the Burden of Proof on the Accused’ (1995) 
LQR 475.  
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comorbid conditions exist, and tools for differential diagnosis are poor or altogether 
unavailable.  
 We are left with a series of mismatches that negatively impact the law as it is 
applied: mismatches between the doctrinal rules and their underlying policy goals, as 
well as mismatches between expert medical diagnosis that is frequently multi-factorial 
and probabilistic, and the entrenched legal requirement for simple, clear-cut causal 
identification. This can lead to obvious unfairness, where the nature of D’s condition 
leads to an apparently absurd outcome, for example where those suffering epileptic 
seizures or sleep walking are captured within the insanity rules. But equally concerning 
are the less obvious cases, those where advocates and courts are forced to identify a 
causal root in the face of scientific/clinical uncertainty and/or comorbidity. The issue 
here is the uncertainty and inconsistency of outcome, with factually complex causal 
relationships necessarily side-lined within the courts.27 And within this, we can be left 
with fine lined and blurred factual distinctions marking either side of the liability 
threshold, including for the most serious offences.   
 The facts of Taj provide a valuable case in point. At the time of the attack, Taj 
was experiencing a delusional state of mind which led him to mistakenly believe that 
force was necessary to prevent Awain committing a terrorist act. Expert evidence 
initially identified the cause of his delusions as ‘drug/alcohol induced psychosis’ 
resulting from his prior drug and/or alcohol intake,28 before later (the day before Taj’s 
appeal) indicating that his symptoms may have been alternatively caused by an 
underlying mental illness, ‘probably bipolar affective disorder (also known as manic 
depression)’, separate from but potentially exacerbated by his historic drug and 
alcohol misuse.29 In this way, the Court of Appeal was faced with facts that arguably 
raised voluntary intoxication, which would result in liability; yet facts not necessarily 
                                                          
27 This is especially evident in the divide between intoxication and insanity. For example, D’s 
intoxication may be taken to be the primary cause of his conduct despite evidence of (separate or 
secondary) mental illness, as we see in Majewski [1977] AC 443 (D was a drug addict and had a 
personality disorder) and Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152 (D was a drug addict); or dismissed as incidental, 
as we see in Press [2013] EWCA Crim 1849 (focusing instead on D’s PTSD) and Oye [2013] EWCA 
Crim 1725 (focusing on D’s psychosis as detached from the drug use that likely caused it to manifest),  
with often minimal discussion. A similar dismissal of intoxication is evident in Roach [2001] EWCA 
Crim 2698 in the context of automatism. For discussion of similar problems, including within the 
Australian context, see Loughnan and Wake, ‘Of blurred boundaries and prior fault: Insanity, 
Automatism and Intoxication’ in Reed and Bohlander (eds) General Defences in Criminal Law (2014) 
113, Part 2. 
28 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [61]. On the accepted facts, Taj was not under the direct influence of 
drugs at the time of the attack; he claimed not to have taken any alcohol or drugs since the early 
hours of the previous day, and no drugs test was performed by the police. Taj also had a long history 
of alcohol and drug use dating back to his early teens interlocked with previous occasions, starting in 
2009, when he presented with psychiatric symptoms, which were attributed to his excessive use of 
drugs and alcohol. In the expert’s ‘Heads of Agreement’ Statement from Drs. Reid and Browne (13th 
October, 2016), both ‘drug induced psychosis’ and ‘drug/alcohol induced psychotic disorder’ are 
mentioned as the cause of Taj paranoid state of mind. We presume these two phrasings (one using 
the wording ’disorder’) to mean the same and to refer what others have named alcohol hallucinosis; a 
psychotic state of mind (with or without the presence of delusions) appearing subsequent to, but not 
directly caused by the presence of alcohol and/or drugs in the system. 
29 Psychiatric Report from Dr Alan Reid (25th April 2018).  
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incompatible with a finding of insanity, resulting in the special verdict; or alternatively, 
facts involving delusions not caught within the intoxication or insanity rules, and where 
the resolution of the case is less obvious. The following parts of this article explore 
these options in turn, highlighting general problems with their application, as well as 
specific challenges from Taj.     
  
2. When to Apply the Intoxication Rules 
The intoxication rules are grounded and justified by the simple intuition that ‘no wrong 
is done’ by criminalising D who causes harms having voluntarily taken ‘a substance 
which causes him to cast off the restraints of reason and conscience’.30 In other words, 
even where D’s intoxication results in a lack of mens rea and/or voluntariness (for 
basic intent offences), and/or results in a mistaken belief that might otherwise avail 
him of a defence, liability should nevertheless be found. In order to achieve this 
intuitive goal, the intoxication rules are perhaps inevitably complex. However, a 
remarkable feature of their evolution at common law has been the avoidance of 
complexities wherever possible, even at the expense of legal principle and potential 
over-criminalisation. Debates illustrating this point are now familiar in the literature: the 
choice to present intoxication as a defence, framing the debate in terms of limiting 
exculpation due to drunkenness;31 holding voluntary intoxication as an objectively 
understood wrong, avoiding the need for subjective foresight of harms32 and questions 
of degree;33 allowing intoxication to substitute for missing culpability at the (basic 
intent) ‘offence’ level, avoiding the need to identify intoxication as equivalent to a 
precise mens rea term;34 and so on. This has resulted in the intoxication rules 
becoming an exceptionally punitive doctrine of prior fault inculpation. 
 Despite the (overly) punitive construction of these rules in creating liability, 
however, the initial gateway requiring a state of ‘intoxication’ has remained in place; 
strictly and consistently distinguished from cases of non-intoxication or insanity.35 And 
this is despite a similar prior fault logic/intuition surely applying beyond drug taking; for 
                                                          
30 Majewski [1977] AC 443, 474. 
31 Simester, ‘Intoxication is never a defence’ [2009] CrimLR 3.   
32 Crombag, Child and Fortson, ‘Understanding the “Fault” in Prior-Fault Intoxication: Insights from 
Behavioural Neuroscience’ (forthcoming).  
33 Intoxication rules will apply regardless of D’s exceptional or unexpected reaction to any degree of 
relevant intoxication. See Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223, [18] where the effect of cannabis in inducing 
a vivid delusion which held D in its grip, which although a very rare occurrence, did not make the 
Court of Appeal receptive to arguments that his condition amounted to automatism or insanity rather 
than intoxication.   
34 The Law Commission recommended changes to the intoxication rules in 2009 that would have 
removed offence distinctions, with intoxication applying as a direct substitution for certain mens rea 
relevant to offence elements rather than whole offences: Intoxication and Criminal Liability (Law Com 
No 314, 2009). However, the Commission’s recommendations were criticised as overly complex, and 
otherwise problematic, and were rejected by Government. See, Child, ‘Drink, drugs and law reform: a 
review of Law Commission Report No.314’ [2009] CrimLR 488.   
35 See Beard [1920] AC 479, 496-501 regarding the distinction between intoxication and mental 
illness resulting from chronic drugs use, as in addiction illness; and Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563 
regarding the distinction between intoxication and post-intoxication withdrawal.   
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example, where D recklessly or negligently fails to take medication, or drives when 
sleep deprived, etc.36 There are several possible explanations for the focus on 
intoxication, including the historic disdain for psychoactive drugs and drug taking,37 
widely held but oversimplified beliefs about links between drug use and crime, as well 
as the apparent legal certainty provided by the term ‘intoxication’ over less determinate 
language such as ‘prior fault’. It is true that we can identify some application of prior 
fault logic within automatism, and certain general defences, but not with the same 
broad terms that we see for intoxication.38 The intoxication rules, therefore, remain a 
special case (and essentially a proxy) for intrinsic prior fault. But, despite this status, 
the intoxication rules are significantly limited by the prosecution being required to 
prove that D was intoxicated at the time of the alleged offence. 
 Taj is an important case because it is the first to reinterpret the boundaries of 
‘intoxication’ rules, at least in the context of self-defence,39 to allow for wider 
application of the prior fault doctrine. Because Taj was not blood-tested, it could not 
be claimed that he had drugs active in his system at the time of the attack (ie, the 
mistaken self-defence), but the expert evidence at trial agreed that his paranoid and 
delusional state of mind was the result of a psychosis or psychotic disorder resulting 
from his previous heavy use of alcohol and/or drugs (ie, cannabis and/or cocaine).40 
This was enough for the trial judge to hold that Taj’s delusional mistaken belief was 
‘attributable to intoxication’ and therefore excluded from consideration when applying 
self-defence in line with the intoxication rules,41 effectively blocking his defence. The 
same logic was accepted by the Court of Appeal in upholding Taj’s conviction: ‘the 
words "attributable to intoxication" in s. 76(5) are broad enough to encompass … a 
mistaken state of mind immediately and proximately consequent upon earlier drink or 
drug-taking.’42  
This interpretation is understandable from a policy perspective, as even without 
alcohol or drugs active in his system, Taj’s psychosis might conceivably have been 
caused by his recent and heavy use of intoxicants. The exclusion of intoxicated beliefs 
from the plea of mistaken self-defence rests on public safety concerns. Those 
concerns would seem even more on point in the case of persons, who, like Taj, 
become dangerous upon taking intoxicants and continue to be dangerous even when 
                                                          
36 See Mitchell, Self-Made Madness: Rethinking Illness and Criminal Responsibility (Ashgate, 2003).  
37 See Handler, ‘Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility in England, 1819–1920’ (2013) 33 OJLS 243; 
Mitchell, ‘The Intoxicated Offender – Refuting the Legal and Medical Myths’ (1988) IntJLawPsy 77.  
38 See Child, ‘Prior fault: blocking defences or constructing crimes’ in Reed & Bohlander (eds) 
General Defences in Criminal Law (Routledge, 2014) 37. 
39 We discuss the wider potential application of the case below.  
40 During an initial interview by the consulting psychiatrist at HMP Thameside, Taj admitted he had 
consumed ‘7-10 cans of lager, and a few Jaeggerbombs, red bull and cocaine’ prior to the offence.  
During his subsequent interview by the expert consulting psychiatrist, Taj’s said he had only 
consumed alcohol (7-10 pints of lager, a few double vodkas and two glasses of champagne 
approximately 30 hours prior to the offense, as well as ‘a few pints at various pubs’ approximately 10 
hrs prior to the offence) but he denied using any illicit drugs. This ended up in the expert ‘Heads of 
Agreement’ as ‘drug induced psychosis’ and ‘drug and drug/alcohol induced psychotic disorder’. 
41 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s76(5).  
42 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [60]. 
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the intoxicants they have taken have ceased to be chemically active in their systems. 
From a public safety perspective, it seems good sense to include Taj within the class 
of persons regarded as intoxicated when, in a deluded state of mind, he attacked 
Awain. 
However, for reasons which will be developed more fully below, we believe that 
the court was wrong to find D’s state to be one of ‘intoxication’ or ‘attributable to 
intoxication’. This is not to say that his plea of mistaken self-defence should have been 
accepted. Instead, it will be argued, his delusion should have been taken to be an 
insane delusion. Until the decision in Taj, there was a sharp divide drawn between 
cases where D’s disordered thinking was attributable to the effect of intoxicants which 
were chemically active, and disordered thinking arising beyond that period. Persons 
in the latter case were not regarded as intoxicated even when it was clear that their 
deluded state would not have occurred unless intoxicants had been taken. Analysing 
Taj within the first category is deeply problematic, both in terms of causal uncertainty, 
as well as, given Taj’s long history of drink and drug taking, we cannot even be sure 
that he was ever intoxicated in the ordinary sense of that word during his pre-attack 
drinking bout. The only certainty is that he was aware (or at least, could have been 
aware) that his drink/drug habit might make him violent.43 That makes it all the more 
important to make an effective public safety response to his dangerous conduct, but it 
does not mandate an intoxication rules approach. The better way is not to equate ‘drug 
induced’ with ‘attributable to intoxication’.44 The better way is to find that Taj was 
insane when he attacked Awain.  
 
Can we isolate prior taking of intoxicants as the cause of psychosis? 
In order to apply the intoxication rules beyond the ‘simple’ cases where drugs are 
present and active in D’s system, in a way that has not previously been done in case 
law, the court in Taj sets out an essential premise:   
The fact is that medical science has advanced such that, in the modern 
age, the longer term sequelae of abusing alcohol or drugs are better known 
and understood; and, as in the present case, it was agreed that Taj's 
episode of paranoia which led him to mistake the innocent Mr Awain as a 
                                                          
43 On several previous occasions Taj’s drug and/or alcohol use had resulted in him experiencing 
psychiatric symptoms, described on one occasion in 2009 as ‘paranoid, screaming and shouting’ 
leading to his forcible hospital admission under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act. Furthermore, Taj 
admitted drug and/or alcohol intoxication were a common feature in a number of previous offences, 
including one for sexual assault and another for destruction/damaging of property; the latter of which 
resulted in a 3-week prison sentence.  
44 The lack of precedent defining ‘intoxication’ in law makes this point arguable, but there are good 
reasons to reject it. Natural (and scientific) understandings of ‘intoxication’ do not simply equate to the 
presence of a drug in D’s system, this is necessary but not sufficient. Rather, to be intoxicated also 
requires threshold psychological effects on D’s cognition and behaviour. The point here is that we 
should not equate ‘drug induced’ with ‘intoxication induced’ as the court does in Taj, and to do so 
represents a faulty mechanism for expanding liability.  
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terrorist was a direct result of his earlier drink and drug-taking in the 
previous days and weeks.45 
It is noteworthy that despite this explicit appeal to medical science, the court chooses 
to rely on the Oxford Dictionary when interpreting both ‘intoxication’ and what it means 
for psychosis to be ‘attributed’ to intoxication;46 and that although Taj is described as 
‘suffering from a direct or acute reaction to the voluntarily taken intoxicants, whether 
or not they were present in his system’,47 the terms ‘direct and acute’ are used clinically 
to differentiate intoxication when alcohol or drugs are present and active from 
subsequent more persistent or chronic effects.48 However, even putting these 
curiosities to one side,49 the court’s claim that science allows us to make sufficiently 
accurate causal distinctions in cases of this kind remains crucial. It is also incorrect.  
 The court in Taj is not simply requiring us to identify psychosis that is 
attributable to previous intoxication in some way, though this in itself would be 
problematic. Rather, the judgment explicitly requires us to differentiate psychoses 
directly caused by preceding intoxication (caught within legal intoxication rules) from 
psychoses caused by acute withdrawal and delirium tremens, mental illness resulting 
from and secondary to historic drug use, and/or mental illness separate from and co-
morbid with drug use (all of which fall outside legal intoxication rules).50 If we accept 
the approach in Oye, the expectation even extends to distinguishing a single-step 
connection (ie, intoxication leading to post-intoxication psychosis) from the two-step 
approach used to establish insanity and rule out intoxication in that case (ie, 
intoxication leading to pathophysiological brain changes leading to post-intoxication 
psychosis).51 These are fine grained distinctions that require a high level of scientific 
and diagnostic certainty if they are going to adjudicate the boundaries of liability. 
 Unfortunately, the court’s confidence in medical science finds little support in 
the research literature or in the clinic, and this is borne out in the expert’s reports in 
Taj. The expert ‘Heads of Agreement’ may have stated that his delusional state of 
mind was the result of a ‘drug-induced psychotic disorder’,52 but as the experts make 
                                                          
45 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [57]. 
46 Ibid. [21; 59]. 
47 Ibid. [22] (emphasis added). 
48 In pharmacology, ‘active’ refers to the drug not merely being present in the blood circulation or 
tissue but, in the case of psychoactive drugs, binding to some target site in the brain (usually a 
neurotransmitter receptor) to produce a biological effect. 
49 A similar lack of scientific precision is found by Quilter and McNamara in a study of Australian 
cases, ‘The Meaning of “Intoxication” in Australian Criminal Cases: Origins and Operation’ (2018) 
21(1) New Criminal Law Review 170.  
50 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [46-49; 57-60]. Referring to Harris [2013] EWCA Crim 223 and Davis 
(1881) 14 Cox CC 563 on withdrawal, and Beard [1920] AC 479 on addiction.  
51 Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725: summarising the position of the expert in this case, the court explain 
that ‘… the onset of the psychotic disorder was “precipitated” by use of skunk cannabis but “having 
reviewed the further evidence lately presented, it is now my opinion that [the defendant's] actions at 
the time of the allegation [sic] were as a cause of [sic] his psychosis, and not intoxication”.’ Cf Coley 
[2013] EWCA Crim 223, [18]. 
52 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [61]. 
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clear in the accompanying reports,53 this was a likely diagnosis built upon elimination 
rather than firm proof. Indeed, and crucially, the final expert report before Taj’s appeal 
(following further treatment and observation), heavily qualifies that earlier agreement 
with a new diagnosis of mental illness, identified as an alternative potential cause.54 
Such diagnostic uncertainty should not be surprising: the symptoms for psychosis – 
principally delusions and hallucinations – can occur in a range of alcohol (or drug) 
related conditions including acute intoxication, withdrawal (delirium tremens), alcohol 
or drug-induced psychotic disorder (alcohol hallucinosis), disorders associated with 
alcoholism (eg, Korsakoff’s dementia), etc; but equally can indicate the presence of a 
co-morbid (prodromal) mental illness separate from and/or triggered by drug and/or 
alcohol use. These (and other) alcohol and drug-related causes of psychotic 
symptoms are well recognised within the research and clinical literature as being 
epidemiologically distinct, but understanding of the precise phenomenological features 
and underlying neurobiological mechanisms is far from settled,55 making clinical 
diagnosis to differentiate one from the others complex and prone to error. To this point, 
in a three-year follow-up study of 535 cases initially diagnosed as acute cannabis-
induced psychosis, 44.5% were later re-diagnosed as (also) having schizophrenic-
spectrum disorder.56 Contrary to the court’s statements in Taj, this is not an exact 
science. 
 If we accept the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of ‘attributable to intoxication’ 
in Taj, we accept yet a further layer of uncertainty and imprecision in the application 
of intoxication rules, additional to those we have already identified. Without scientific 
clarity in determining a cause, yet with a set of legal rules built around strict causal 
distinctions, further inconsistent and unfair outcomes are inevitable.   
 
Should we try to isolate the prior taking of intoxicants as the cause of 
psychosis? 
Even if firm scientific and clinical distinctions were possible, separating psychosis 
induced from previous intoxication as opposed to withdrawal or alcohol/drug-related 
or primary mental illness, it is contended that extending the intoxication rules to include 
such cases would be a mistake. Focusing on the intuitive appeal of prior fault rules, 
the court in Taj reflect that such a change would be ‘an application of Majewski, rather 
than an extension of that decision or, at the highest, a most incremental extension.’57 
                                                          
53 Discussed in the Psychiatric Report from Dr Alan Reid (24th July 2016), and accompanying 
addendums.  
54 Psychiatric Report from Dr Alan Reid (25th April 2018). 
55 Greenberg and Lee, ‘Psychotic manifestations of alcoholism’ (2001) 3(4) Current Psychiatry 
Reports, 314; Stankewicz and Salen, ‘Alcohol Related Psychosis’ in StatPearls (internet) Treasure 
Island (FL) 2019; Perälä et al, ‘Alcohol-induced psychotic disorder and delirium in the general 
population’ (2010) BJ Psychiatry, 197, 200-6. 
56 Arendt et al, ‘Cannabis-induced psychosis and subsequent schizophrenia-spectrum disorders: 
follow-up study of 535 incident cases’ (2005) BJ Psychiatry, 510. 
57 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [57]. 
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We agree that the interpretation in Taj builds on, as opposed to redefines, the prior 
fault logic from Majewski; but therein lies the problem. 
 The Majewski (intoxication rules) approach to prior fault, as we discussed 
above, is exceptional for its over-inclusive inculpatory effects. For example, although 
the court in Taj highlights D’s prior awareness that becoming intoxicated could cause 
him to experience psychotic episodes,58 subjective foresight of this kind is irrelevant 
to the rules’ application: the intoxication rules will apply whenever D voluntarily 
consumes dangerous drugs leading to a lack of mens rea, and/or to an unreasonable 
mistaken belief, irrespective of whether D foresaw these possibilities when consuming 
the drugs. In this manner, it is questionable whether any expansion of the intoxication 
rules in their current state should be contemplated, with the objective fault of 
consumption already opening a potentially over-criminalising route to liability. 
Expanding the intoxication rules to cover post-intoxication psychosis will create a new 
route to liability based on objective fault for these defendants, potentially days or 
weeks after drug use.59 It will also introduce a further layer of outcome luck, punishing 
D for his abnormal (and often unforeseen) reaction to drugs. In this manner, expansion 
would exacerbate existing problems with the law, as well as creating new ones.  
 Finally, we might ask why any normative prior fault led expansion of the 
intoxication rules should include post-intoxication psychosis, but stop short at 
withdrawal and alcohol or drug related mental illness. D’s choice to take a dangerous 
drug (ie, D’s prior fault) provides an identical route into each; and the psychotic 
episodes that result are likewise indistinguishable from a culpability perspective.60 It 
may be that the court in Taj would have preferred to extend the intoxication rules into 
these categories as well, but felt unable to do so in light of conflicting case law. 
However, if this is correct, then the desire for such expansion should be 
acknowledged; as well as the burden to justify the application of prior fault rules to 
mental-illness and other non-intoxicated states that may have arisen weeks, months 
or even years before the potentially criminal event.61 If expansion of this kind was not 
the court’s purpose, alternatively, we need to understand the normative case for an 
incremental expansion to drug-induced psychosis alone, especially as it relies on a 
boundary that (if accepted) will cause significant forensic problems for courts and 
experts.   
 
Evaluating the Taj precedent on intoxication 
                                                          
58 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [16; 45]. 
59 Highlighted for criticism in Dsouza, ‘Intoxication, psychoses, and self-defence: Evaluating Taj’ 
(2018) Arch Rev 6, 8; Laird Comment [2019] CrimLR 167, 170.  
60 The discussion in Taj can be read to indicate that intoxication-induced psychosis is temporally 
closer to direct intoxication than the others. However, whether this is an intended implication or not, it 
is factually inaccurate. See Maldonado, ‘An Approach to the Patient with Substance Use and Abuse’ 
(2010) Medical Clinics of North America, 1169. 
61 The need for an intoxication-based cause would also become much harder to maintain. 
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Taj is directly concerned with the intoxication rules as they apply to self-defence, and 
to the meaning of ‘attributable to intoxication’ in that context. However, in the light of 
the discussion in Taj of Harris and Majewski in particular, the strong (obiter) implication 
is that the court’s expanded definition of intoxication should be applied more generally 
(ie, including cases where the intoxication rules are used to replace missing mens rea 
elements).62 This conclusion seems inevitable. Normatively, the justifications for 
liability offered in Taj do not discriminate between the different contexts in which the 
intoxication rules apply; and, practically, there is obvious merit in avoiding parallel 
contrasting definitions of intoxication and attributable to intoxication. The difficulty, of 
course, is that this would extend all the problems discussed in the last two sections to 
a considerably greater range of cases. 
 The Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the intoxication rules in Taj thereby 
creates an unwelcome precedent, and one with considerable potential breadth. 
However, it is useful to acknowledge a certain fragility in the court’s ratio. Although the 
court focuses their discussion on the intoxication rules, it also acknowledges the 
possibility (arising from an expert report just one day before the appeal was heard63) 
that Taj’s psychosis was not drug-induced, but rather arose from a subsequently 
diagnosed independent mental disorder, namely manic depression (bipolar disorder). 
The court maintains that this evidence does not afford new grounds for appeal 
because evidence ‘that a psychotic episode may have been precipitated without 
alcohol or drugs says nothing about whether it was (as Taj agreed he knew to be the 
case) in fact precipitated on this occasion by alcohol and drugs.’64 This, with respect, 
is wholly unconvincing.  
Where a prosecution relies on the intoxication rules to find liability (substituting 
for missing mens rea, or undermining an honest mistaken belief defence), they must 
discharge the burden of proving the elements of prior fault intoxication beyond 
reasonable doubt. D’s subsequent diagnosis may not demonstrate ‘as fact’ that his 
psychotic episode was non-drug induced, but the significant chance of psychosis 
arising from causes unrelated to drug-taking certainly raises a reasonable doubt; and 
a doubt that is not dispelled by any acceptance by D that his delusion was drug-
induced, especially if made at a time when he too was unaware of his mental illness 
diagnosis. The Court of Appeal appears to recognise something of this argument, 
highlighting that ‘if we are wrong about … the foregoing conclusions’65 then an 
alternative route to dismissing the appeal remains open. We explore this alternative 
below in Part 4. For present purposes, our aim is simply to highlight that the court’s 
focus on the intoxication rules may itself be challenged, and should be used as a basis 
for future advocates and courts to question the authority of Taj on this point.   
                                                          
62 Discussed in Laird Comment [2019] CrimLR 167; and an approach that has been previously 
adopted in Queensland in Re Clough [2007] QMHC 002.   
63 Psychiatric Report from Dr Alan Reid (25th April 2018). 
64 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [61]. 




3. When to Apply the Insanity Rules 
The insanity rules are unusual in that they apply both to those who would otherwise 
be liable for an offence, as a defence properly-so-called, as well as to those who rely 
on an internal condition to explain their lack of offending (ie, to demonstrate a lack of 
mens rea, or the presence of beliefs that would otherwise engage a separate defence). 
In both cases, where the insanity rules are satisfied, D will be found ‘not guilty by 
reason of insanity’66 and subject to a range of disposal orders, including options for 
compulsory restraint. This dual application of the insanity rules can be presented as a 
strength: ensuring insane defendants are not inappropriately blamed for their actions, 
whilst also ensuring through the special verdict that D and the public are protected 
from future harms. Indeed, the explicit inclusion of ‘insane delusions’ within the insanity 
rules has been hailed a ‘humane step forward’ in broadening their application.67 The 
insanity rules should therefore be central to our discussion of legal responses to 
delusional and irrational beliefs.  
 Despite the broad potential application of insanity rules, however, the reality is 
that they play a relatively minor role in practice. In Taj, for example, even when open 
to the possibility that D’s delusional belief could have resulted from an underlying 
mental condition, the court (and experts) were quick to dismiss the insanity rules as 
inapplicable.68 This is because, despite their broad potential, the terms of the insanity 
rules have been interpreted in a progressively narrow and strict manner at common 
law – both in relation to the problematic internal/external divide,69 as well as to the 
other elements (discussed in the sections that follow). There are several possible 
reasons for this interpretive approach, including concerns that a loosening of the 
insanity rules might lead to their abuse through fabrication and/or over-reliance on 
expert evaluation.70 But the result has been something of a retreat from relevance for 
the insanity rules. And within the broadening vacuum where insanity rules do not 
apply, delusional and potentially dangerous defendants are either inappropriately 
criminalised (where offence elements are satisfied) or perhaps inappropriately 
acquitted without protective qualification (where mens rea is absent, or a separate 
defence applies). We discuss the upshot of this vacuum in Part 4.    
 
                                                          
66 Trial of Lunatics Act 1883, s2. 
67 Sullivan [1984] AC 156, 164. 
68 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [21; 33]. 
69 See Wilson et al, ‘Violence, Sleepwalking and the Criminal Law. Part 2: The Legal Aspects’ [2005] 
CrimLR 614.   
70 See Mackay, Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (OUP, 1995) Chapter 2. It should also 
be acknowledged that a single set of doctrinal rules will always struggle to meet the competing 
demands of the current law: namely to sanction past culpability, yet to protect the non-culpable from 
sanction, whilst also protecting against future dangerousness in all cases, even where this means 
depriving access to pleas such as lack of mens rea or mistaken self-defence that would otherwise be 
available. See Child and Sullivan, (n21). 
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Insanity: Not knowing the nature and quality of action      
D’s conduct will be caught within the insanity rules if he does not understand the nature 
and quality of his action, as a result of an internally caused defect of reason. This limb 
of the M’Naghten insanity rules has obvious relevance to delusional and irrational 
conduct, with oft repeated examples including D killing V under the insane delusion he 
is breaking a jar, or cutting V’s throat believing it is a loaf of bread.71 Indeed, this was 
the preferred route taken in Oye,72 where D attacked police officers believing them to 
be possessed and with ‘demon faces’. In each case, D’s delusional belief 
demonstrates a lack of knowledge as to the nature and quality of his action, as well as 
engaging the delusion limb of M’Naghten, satisfying the insanity rules. 
 Despite the application of insanity rules to non-human and/or bizarre delusions 
of this kind, however, a much more restrictive approach has been applied elsewhere.73 
This is clearly evident in Canns,74 for example, where a patient with chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia (described in expert evidence as ‘one of the most disturbed patients 
you could get’75), killed a staff nurse (V) under the mistaken delusion that V was 
attempting to rape him; and yet, presumably because D knew he was killing a person 
as opposed to something more bizarre, the insanity rules did not apply. A similar 
approach is employed in Harris, where D was held to understand the nature and quality 
of his actions described narrowly as ‘setting a fire’, a description which made irrelevant 
for any finding of insanity that D’s mental state meant he did not understand that fire 
could spread to adjoining properties.76 Likewise in Taj, this limb of insanity is 
apparently avoided by describing D’s conduct narrowly as ‘attacking a person’, thus 
relegating to mere background his delusion that V was a terrorist about to cause an 
explosion.77 We see no normative justification for distinguishing these cases from Oye 
or others where insanity is found. The defendants may have understood their conduct 
under a certain narrow description, but they did not understand the nature and quality 
of their action under a fuller, more natural description relevant to the criminal law (ie, 
including relevant circumstances and results).78  
 The potential absurdity of the current rules becomes even clearer when we 
consider changeable delusional states. Oye provides a useful example.79 The Court 
                                                          
71 Taken from Steven’s Digest (1947) and Kenny’s Outlines (2007) respectively.  
72 [2013] EWCA Crim 1725, [16-19]. 
73 See Codere (1916) 12 Cr App R 219; Mackay, ‘Some Observations on the Second Limb of the 
M’Naghten Rules’ [2009] CrimLR 80; Law Commission, (n5) Chapter 1. 
74 [2005] EWCA Crim 2264. 
75 Ibid, [17]. 
76 Harris [2013] EWCA Crim 223, [54; 56]. As D was not found to be insane, his failure to understand 
that fires spread led to the quashing of his conviction for aggravated arson because he did not 
foresee the danger he was creating for third parties. See to similar effect Stephenson [1979] QB 695. 
In both cases a more appropriate verdict would be not guilty by reason of insanity. 
77 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [21; 33]. 
78 Similarly, where D cuts V’s throat believing he is cutting bread, we could narrow down to a basic 
description of D’s bodily movements to highlight these as understood and controlled (ie, the 
movement of D’s arm). However, few would discount the insanity defence on this basis. See useful 
discussion, and a more appropriate interpretation of this limb, in Loake [2017] EWHC 2855.     
79 [2013] EWCA Crim 1725. 
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of Appeal focussed on D’s delusional belief that the police had demon faces when he 
attacked them, satisfying this limb of the insanity rules combined with the delusional 
limb. However, the insanity verdict was also applied to D’s first count of affray (before 
he was arrested) when he did not see demon faces, but merely believed his victims to 
be agents of evil spirits. Focusing on the first count, the approach in Canns, Harris and 
Taj suggests that the insanity rules should not have applied: D understood at that point 
that he was threatening people, he was simply deluded as to the circumstances. The 
court in Oye held (correctly in our view) that the insanity rules should apply here in 
exactly the same way as it did for D’s later delusions.   
 Finally, we might highlight an additional concern arising from Taj, where a 
technical understanding of ‘delusion’ seems to have further restricted D’s access to 
the insanity rules: implying that D’s mistaken belief must satisfy the scientific 
understanding of delusional. This is evident where the expert evidence questions 
whether D’s mistaken belief amounted to a ‘fixed delusional state’,80 a point briefly 
highlighted by the court.81 Where D’s mental disorder causes him to believe something 
that is obviously inaccurate about the circumstances of his conduct, it is unclear why 
it should be of any legal consequence whether this false belief amounted to a 
‘delusion’ as scientifically understood (ie, ‘fixed’ and therefore unshakable by rational 
argument), as long as it undermines his knowledge of the nature and quality of his 
actions at the relevant time. A non-scientific understanding of delusions is clear in 
M’Naghten,82 and has not previously restricted the insanity defence83 (or indeed other 
rules regulating mistaken beliefs84). It is important to guard against further 
unnecessary restrictions of this kind.   
 
Insanity: Not knowing that an action is wrong      
D’s conduct will be caught within the insanity rules if he does not understand that his 
actions are wrong, as a result of a defect of reason arising from an internal cause.85 
This limb of the insanity rules has been criticised for its narrow application, applying to 
a lack of knowledge as to legal wrongfulness, but not applying where D’s condition 
undermines his moral knowledge alone.86 This interpretation is now entrenched, and 
significantly limits the role of the insanity rules.87 
 An additional concern, relevant to Taj, is how legal wrongfulness has been 
interpreted and applied. Where D holds a mistaken belief that his conduct does not 
                                                          
80 Discussed in Psychiatric Report from Dr Alan Reid (25th April 2018) and Addendum (15th May 
2018). 
81 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [33-34]. 
82 M’Naghten (1843) 10 C&F 200, 211: When answering the 4th question.  
83 Press [2013] EWCA Crim 1849, [44]. 
84 Hatton [2005] EWCA Crim 2951, [13]: D’s mistaken belief is clearly caught within the intoxication 
rules whether technically delusional or not.  
85 Burgess [1991] 2 ALL ER 769. 
86 Windle [1952] 2 QB 826; Johnson [2007] EWCA Crim 1978.  
87 Usefully discussed in Law Commission, (n5) [1.49-1.51; 4.19-4.33].  
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constitute an offence, it is clear that this limb of the insanity rules will apply. However, 
it is less clear in cases where D knows he is committing a crime, but mistakenly 
believes he has a complete defence, even a justificatory rational-based defence.88 
Does D understand the legal wrongfulness of his actions in such cases? In M’Naghten, 
the House of Lords’ answer to the 4th question concerning delusional beliefs suggests 
that insanity should apply; indeed, they illustrate this point using the example of 
mistaken self-defence.89 However, in Oye, Canns and Taj, despite each case involving 
delusional beliefs in the need for self-defence, this limb of the insanity rules is not 
applied. Oye came within the insanity rules anyway, but in both Canns and Taj no 
complete defence is found. We do not see a justification for limiting the interpretation 
of ‘legal wrongfulness’ to exclude these cases.     
 
4. What to Apply for ‘Other’ Delusions   
Exacerbated by the narrow application of insanity rules, and to a lesser extent 
intoxication and automatism as well, the conduct of a growing category of delusional 
and potentially dangerous defendants is not captured within any of the legal rules 
already discussed. Indeed, if our analysis of the intoxication rules above is correct, 
and recognising current interpretations of insanity, the case of Taj also defaults into 
this category. In the absence of bespoke rules, we would expect cases here to 
generally apply the standard terms of offences and defences without the kinds of 
qualifications discussed above. However, in the context of delusional, irrational and 
potentially dangerous defendants, this is not always straightforward, and efforts to 
avoid perceived unfairness within individual cases have led to problematic distortions 
in the application of the law. This applies both to the application of offences and 
defences.    
 
Does D commit an offence? 
Even where a delusional or irrational state does not qualify legally as insanity or 
intoxication, it remains relevant to whether D commits an offence. In certain cases, D’s 
delusion may cause him to commit a crime: where, for example, D feels compelled to 
commit an offence, or is otherwise disorientated by the delusion. Harris would have 
been a case of this kind had he been charged with simple arson, as opposed to the 
aggravated form of the offence. Harris was clearly disorientated by his delusional state 
of mind, leading him to perform several bizarre acts, and to lack understanding that 
setting a fire might endanger neighbouring properties; but it was accepted that he 
intentionally caused a fire aware that this could damage his own property.90 For such 
defendants, without an applicable defence, the only possible relief based on their 
                                                          
88 We are intentionally bracketing the ultimately unhelpful debate as to whether D’s defence can be 
classified as negating an element of his offence.   
89 M’Naghten (1843) 10 C&F 200, 211.  
90 Harris [2013] EWCA Crim 223, [54]. 
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delusion will come in the form of mitigation at sentencing. Due to the narrow application 
of insanity rules, it is contended that certain defendants in this category are 
inappropriately criminalised, with sentence mitigation simply not sufficient. The Court 
of Appeal’s choice in Harris to quash D’s conviction for aggravated arson illustrates 
this concern, as the court opted to avoid a retrial on a non-aggravated charge that 
would have been straightforward to prove.91   
 Alternatively, D’s delusion may be relevant to show that he did not commit the 
offence charged. This was the case in Harris regarding aggravated arson. Although a 
reasonable person would have foreseen that a house fire could spread and endanger 
the lives of those in neighbouring properties, it was accepted that D’s delusional state 
meant that he may have lacked subjective foresight.92 As D lacked men rea, and fell 
outside the insanity rules, he was acquitted. The issue here, because of the narrow 
application of insanity rules, is whether the criminal law is insufficiently equipped to 
restrain mentally disordered defendants who might pose a continuing danger to 
themselves or others. And it is a concern that has given rise to some problematic 
contentions. For example, one solution to the ‘problem’ that a ‘bad case of insanity 
[could] make a good case of reasonable doubt,’ has been to argue that delusional 
evidence short of insanity should be excluded from a court’s consideration of mens 
rea (ie, excluded from consideration after insanity is ruled out).93 A response of this 
kind, however, simply takes us back to inappropriate criminalisation: where D does not 
complete the elements of an offence, the default (absent prior fault) should never be 
a fiction of liability. 
 
Can D rely on a defence? 
D’s delusions may also/alternatively affect the application of defences, in cases where 
D completes an offence. In the first instance, delusions may result in the non-
applicability of a defence. Even outside of delusions caused by intoxication (blocking 
defences) or insanity (supervening other defences), delusions of any kind can make it 
very difficult for D to satisfy the objective terms that typify most general defences within 
the current law. For example, if D’s delusion causes him to commit an offence in 
mistaken circumstances of duress or necessity, or causes him to use excessive force 
in self-defence, the reasonableness requirements within each defence are unlikely to 
be satisfied. Where D is blameless for his inability to reach the reasonableness 
standard, the risk of inappropriate criminalisation is obvious, and pushes those 
supporting the use of objective elements to consider specific qualifications to take 
account of physical and mental impairments.94    
                                                          
91 Ibid, [60]. 
92 Ibid, [59]. 
93 Morris and Howard, Studies in Criminal Law (1964) 75-6. Discussed in Jones, (n26), 488. 
94 See Simester, ‘Mistakes in Defence’ (1992) OJLS 295, 305-309.  
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 More controversial however, and relevant to our discussion of Taj, are cases 
where D’s delusion leads to the apparent satisfaction of a subjectively framed defence. 
This has arisen most often in relation to mistaken self-defence, which is constructed 
to assess D’s conduct in light of the facts as he honestly (though not necessarily 
reasonably) believed them to be.95 Thus, where D’s mistake causes him to believe 
that he is being attacked in a certain way, the necessity and proportional 
reasonableness of his response should be assessed as if his belief was a reality. The 
subjective construction of self-defence has been criticised as overly generous to D, 
with commentators questioning the appropriateness of unreasonable mistakes as 
grounds for acquittal.96 However, in the context of defendants who are unable to satisfy 
a reasonableness standard by virtue of their non-culpable delusional state, a 
subjective approach of this kind is perhaps easier to justify.  
 What we see in practice, however, is something quite different. Rather than 
acquitting non-insane and non-intoxicated delusional defendants acting in mistaken 
self-defence (arguably the most sympathetic defendants in this context), a line of case 
law has developed to single out such defendants for special inculpatory treatment; 
introducing a new reasonableness criterion, and effectively blocking their use of the 
defence.97 The denial of defences here is explicitly linked to the perceived need to 
protect society from delusional and potentially dangerous individuals, defaulting to 
liability in the absence of an insanity verdict.98 In culpability terms, the outcome is 
perverse: typical defendants, those ostensibly able to meet a reasonableness 
standard, are allowed to rely on their unreasonable beliefs to gain an acquittal; whilst 
those unable to meet a reasonableness standard, due to their non-culpable delusional 
state, are uniquely held to that objective standard. Crucially, this is not the supervening 
effect of the insanity verdict (qualifying D’s acquittal to allow for treatment and potential 
restraint), but the supervening imposition of criminal liability.   
The unfairness of the current law has been obfuscated by the manner of its 
application, but remains in place. It is interesting, for example, that courts have 
avoided presenting the rules as a denial of the subjective limb of self-defence (avoiding 
explicitly denying delusional defendants the right to rely upon their honest beliefs, akin 
to intoxicated defendants), but have spoken instead of a qualification to the second 
already objective limb. We are told in Martin, that ‘in deciding whether excessive force 
has been used [we should not] take into account whether the defendant is suffering 
from some psychiatric condition’;99 in Canns, that ‘it cannot be right that the more 
psychotic a defendant may be the greater his chances of acquittal’;100 and in Oye, that 
                                                          
95 Gladstone Williams (1984) 78 Cr App R 273; codified within the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008, s76(4)(b). 
96 See, eg, Simester, (n94). 
97 See Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245, Canns [2005] EWCA Crim 2264; Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 
1725, and now Taj. 
98 Note the similarity here with our discussion, above, of non-insane and non-intoxicated delusions 
that result in missing offence elements.  
99 [2001] EWCA Crim 2245, [67]. 
100 [2005] EWCA Crim 2264, [19], following Martin. 
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an ‘insane person cannot set the standards of reasonableness as to the degree of 
force used by reference to his own insanity’.101 The problem with this analysis is that 
it disguises rather than addresses the issue: where D makes a mistake for any reason 
(including delusions) as to the necessity of defensive force, his response will never 
pass the second limb of self-defence unless the reasonableness of his force is 
measured against the facts as he honestly believed them to be. Allowing delusions 
within the first limb of the defence is therefore meaningless unless they are also 
allowed to qualify the application of the second limb.102    
The unfairness of the current law has also been partly disguised by the 
availability of alternative defences: diminished responsibility in Martin and Canns, and 
insanity in Oye. In this manner, the unavailability of self-defence can be presented as 
a mechanism for diverting mentally disordered individuals to more appropriate 
bespoke defences. However, again, this is not sufficient. Outside of Oye and the 
narrow application of insanity rules, it is important to remember that liability is resulting 
from these cases. And even partial defences will not always be available, as we see 
in Taj. The court in Taj explains that, ‘even if’ D’s delusion was caused by a non-insane 
and non-intoxicated delusion, applying the ‘equally apposite’ authority from Oye (under 
discussion) remains a straightforward basis for rejecting D’s appeal.103 We agree that 
this is the outcome of applying the rule from Martin, Canns, and Oye, but we do not 
agree that this is either appropriate or fair. Oye is better explained as an example of 
insanity rules supervening other defences, justified on the basis that D is still acquitted, 
although the court gains new protective disposal powers.104 This explanation does not 
apply to Taj, who without even a partial defence was sentenced to 19 years 
imprisonment.105 
We acknowledge that there is a credible case for reforming the terms of self-
defence to require an objectively reasonable belief in both the necessity and 
reasonableness of force.106 However, it cannot be correct that an objective approach 
of this kind should only apply to those defendants who, without fault, are uniquely 
unable to meet that standard. Indeed, if self-defence were reformed to require 
objective tests across both limbs, we would expect the reasonableness standard to be 
explicitly qualified to take account of circumstances of this kind (as we see, to a greater 
                                                          
101 [2013] EWCA Crim 1725, [47], following Martin and Canns. 
102 The debate here has been further confused by reference in Martin to the potential for a psychiatric 
condition to be taken into account in ‘exceptional circumstances’ (Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245, 
[67]), distracting from the more fundamental question of why it should ever be excluded. See 
Dingwall, ‘Intoxicated Mistakes about the Need for Self-Defence’ (2007) MLR 127, 131.   
103 Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [63-64]. Cf Press [2013] EWCA Crim 1849, [44].  
104 See Child and Sullivan, (n21). 
105 From the available reports of the case, it appears that the chance to argue against the application 
of insanity rules to sane defendants was not provided in Taj. Neither at trial nor at the appeal did the 
prosecution argue for this alternative route to confirming the conviction. It was something raised on its 
own initiative by the Court of Appeal in the course of its judgment. The court did not adjourn to allow 
at a later date defence submission on this novel point. The lack of adversarial scrutiny of this point is 
therefore particularly concerning, alongside its problematic substantive effects. 
106 Cf Dsouza, Rationale-Based Defences in Criminal Law (2017) 41-43.  
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and lesser extent, across other defences that apply objective tests).107 It is never 
acceptable to criminalise non-culpable individuals simply in order to protect against 
the potential for future harms,108 and yet it is difficult to explain the current law in any 
other way.     
 
5. Conclusion 
The law has tolerated inconsistencies and rough justice proxies in relation to 
delusional defendants for decades. However, as we begin to pick apart each of the 
causal routes at play, tracing the options discussed in Taj and other cases, the 
potential (and demonstrable) unfairness within the law becomes ever clearer. In line 
with our analysis in this article, simple clarifications can be made immediately at 
common law to improve the current position: 
(i) D’s status should only be described in terms of ‘intoxication’ or ‘attributable 
to intoxication’ where drugs are present and active in his system. This 
requires courts to reject the precedent from Taj on this point; 
(ii) The insanity defence should be interpreted more permissively, taking 
account of circumstances and results when assessing D’s understanding of 
her conduct, and taking account of belief in a defence when assessing D’s 
knowledge of wrongfulness and when applying the delusional limb of the 
Rules; and 
(iii) Where D has a mental disorder which results in a mistaken (potentially 
delusional) belief, the relevance of that belief to subjective elements within 
a defence should only be qualified/denied in circumstances of prior fault or 
insanity. This requires courts to abolish the line of precedent (Martin, Canns, 
Oye, and Taj) that qualifies the second limb of self-defence in this context. 
When dealing with delusional, irrational and potentially dangerous defendants, there 
will always be challenges for the law, and our recommended changes do not resolve 
the basic structural problem with the current law that we identified in Part 1 – that we 
are applying cause-directed legal rules to situations where cause is almost always 
uncertain. However, on each point, we believe that our suggestions will make the law 
fairer, more consistent, and more scientifically credible; and within the context of 
litigation, will allow defence advocates to introduce evidence of mental disorder without 
(presently understandable) concern that this could jeopardise their case.109 In this 
manner, we contend, they provide the best route forward for the common law. 
                                                          
107 See Simester, (n94) at 306. 
108 See discussion of the distinction between ‘clutchable’ and ‘criminal’ defendants in Feinberg, (n4) at 
Chapters 10 and 11.  
109 Under the current law, following Taj, mentally disordered defendants face a dilemma in 
constructing a defence: do they (i) rely on evidence of their mental disorder, undermining the potential 
for mistaken self-defence but opening the possibility of an insanity verdict (knowing that this defence 
is narrowly applied), or do they (ii) not rely on evidence of their mental disorder, undermining the 
potential for insanity but opening the possibility for mistaken self-defence (knowing that their belief 
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may be less credible without evidence of their disorder). In each case, the default is liability. Following 
our recommendations, defendants will be free to raise mistaken self-defence with reference to their 
mental disorder. If D’s disordered mistakes are of sufficient degree to come within the insanity 
defence then this will supervene, but importantly, if not, mistaken self-defence will remain.     
